Epictetus Discourses 1.18: Why We Should Not be Angry With Others
How to be Invincible examines the discourse of Epictetus from Book 1, Chapter 18. Here we learn more about the dichotomy of control.
The Discourses of Epictetus were recorded by his student Arrian during teaching sessions at Nicopolis in the early second century. Chapter 1.18 is titled That We Should Not Be Angry at Men’s Errors. It brings together arguments from several earlier chapters, most directly chapter 1.1 on the dichotomy of control and chapter 1.12 on contentment, and arrives at the definition of the invincible person. View the full Book 1 commentary.
What Epictetus Is Arguing in Discourses 1.18
How to be invincible? This is where the chapter ends. But the steps Epictetus takes to get there are vital to getting there. The chapter opens with a philosophical question that reframes the entire problem of anger from the ground up.
"If what the philosophers say be true, that all men's actions proceed from one source, namely feeling, such that in the case of assent, it is the feeling that something is so, and of dissent, the feeling that it is not so, and, by Zeus, in the case of suspended judgment, the feeling that it is uncertain… if all this is in fact true, why should we still be angry at the multitude?"
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 18.1-2
All actions come from one source: judgment. Before we can assent, dissent, or withhold judgment, we need to know the truth as best we can. We observe what is happening, apply reason and logic, and act accordingly. But this process does not always work cleanly. Impulses, wants, desires, and aversions can step in before reason does and lead us away from what we know to be good. That is where thieves, robbers, and adulterers come from, not from malice, but from a misfire in the process of judgment.
Error Is Caused by Ignorance
"Show them their error, and you will see how they will amend their faults; but, if they do not see it, they have nothing higher than their personal opinion to rely on."
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 18.4
This is the Socratic doctrine adopted by the Stoics: no one does wrong willingly. The thief believes the good lies in what they are taking. The adulterer believes the good lies in what they are pursuing. They are not acting with full knowledge that they are doing wrong. They are acting on a mistaken belief about where the good is. Show them the mistake and they will stop. If they cannot see it, they have nothing to correct their course but their own unchecked opinion. Should we be angry at this or pity it?
Contemporary psychology arrives at the same position through a different route. Most harmful behaviour comes not from malice but from cognitive distortions and false beliefs about what will produce well-being. The person who lashes out believes it will relieve their distress. The person who deceives believes it will secure their interests. They are wrong in both cases and they are suffering for being wrong. Compassion and correction are the rational responses. Anger mistakes the symptom for the cause.
The Most Valuable Thing
"If the greatest harm a man can suffer is to be deprived of the most valuable things, and the most valuable thing in each man is a right moral choice, when any one is deprived just this thing, how can one still be angry with him?"
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 18.8
Epictetus compares thieves and robbers to a blind person who cannot distinguish white from black. The blindness is not a choice. It is a condition. The thief cannot see the good from the bad as clearly as they would need to in order to act differently. They have already suffered the greatest possible harm: the loss of right moral choice. How can you be angry at someone who is already deprived of the very thing that would allow them to do better? And how morally perfect are you in the choices you make? Only the Sage has complete vision. The rest of us are all working with partial sight.
Be Angry With Yourself Rather Than With Others
"How have you suddenly become so wise that you are angry at others as though they were mere fools?"
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 18.11
Why do we get angry? We admire the things that such people take from us. The robber steals our possessions, the adulterer our partner, and we lose our composure because we have placed too much value on these externals. The anger is not really about them. It is about our own attachment to things outside the sphere of choice.
"If you give up on these things, and look upon them as nothing, with whom will you still be angry? But as long as you admire them, be angry with yourself rather than with others."
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 18.12
The Cake and the Window
"Why, if you show a cake to greedy people, and devour it all yourself, would you not expect them to snatch it from you? Do not provoke them, do not have a window, do not air your clothes."
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 18.14
The practical application follows directly. If you display what you value, you invite others to take it. The advice is not that the thief is right to steal. It is that the anger at being stolen from is a signal: you were advertising something you should not have been advertising. The person who knows where the good actually lies does not need to display it. It cannot be shown in a window, nor can it be aired with the clothes. It lives in the sphere of choice, where no one can reach it.
A Man Can Only Lose What He Has
"For a man can only lose what he has."
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 18.16
Epictetus tells the story of his iron lamp, stolen from his household. He replaced it with an earthenware one: the light is the same, the incentive for theft is less. The lamp was never truly his. He was using it. What is truly ours, what we actually have, is our reason, our opinions, our judgments, and our actions. Even the body is not ours: it will be returned. If we own nothing except what lies within the sphere of choice, then a thief can only take what we were lending ourselves temporarily. The grief and anger that follow a theft are the grief and anger of someone who forgot the terms of the loan. Epictetus comes back to the lamp story in Chapter 1.29.
The Tyrant and Know Thyself
"But the tyrant will chain — what? — Your leg. He will cut off — what? — Your head. What is there, then, that he can neither chain nor cut off? — Your choice. Hence the advice of the ancients — Know thyself."
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 18.17
The tyrant is the extreme case. Every external can be threatened and taken. The leg can be chained. The head can be cut off. The possessions can be seized. But the prohairesis, the faculty of choice, cannot be touched. It is not a physical thing. It exists in no place the tyrant can reach. Know thyself, the ancients said: know what you are and what is truly yours. Once you know that, no threat operates on you in the way it was designed to. The tyrant can chain the leg. He cannot chain the judgment of the person whose leg is being chained. That judgment remains exactly as free as it was before the chain was applied.
Do Not Groan Within Yourself
"I do not say you may not groan, but do not groan within yourself."
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 18.19
This is not a call for emotional suppression. When we are hurt, we react. A groan, a cry, whatever expression the initial shock produces: this is human and it is not what Epictetus is addressing. What he is addressing is what happens after the initial reaction. The groan that turns inward becomes self-pity, victim mentality, and the hardening of the belief that things should have been different from how they were. Do not let the groan go inward. Let the reaction pass and assess the situation correctly. What is actually yours here? What has been taken that was truly yours? And what has been done to something that was only borrowed?
The Invincible Person
"Who then is the invincible man? He whom nothing outside of the sphere of choice can disconcert."
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 18.21
Not physical strength. Not wealth or status or the goodwill of powerful people. Invincibility is defined by what can and cannot move you. The person who has placed their good entirely within the sphere of choice has nothing for the external world to grip. The thief can take the lamp but not the judgment. The tyrant can chain the leg but not the choice. This works for men and women equally and has nothing to do with how strong the body is. He compares the person who puts their invincibility on physical strength to an ass. The body will falter. The possessions will be taken. The question is only: what happens to your governing part when they are?
When we learn to place the right value on things, anger at those who steal or harm us dissolves. They are losing the one thing that matters: the right moral choice. We choose not to lose it with them. And in that choice, we become able to overcome all of it.
The Exercise: The Pause Before the Word
Disciplines: Assent · Action | Timing: In the moment of anger · immediate
The next time you feel anger rising at another person’s action, before you speak or act, insert one pause. Not a long pause. Just enough to ask one question.
The question is: what did this person believe the good to be when they acted this way? Not whether they were right. Whether they were acting from malice or from a mistaken belief about where the good lies. The thief believes the good lies in what they are taking. The person who dismissed you believes the good lies in the approval they are protecting. They are wrong. They are also suffering the consequences of being wrong, because they have lost access to the one thing that would allow them to do better: right moral choice.
Then ask the second question: what does my anger tell me I am overvaluing? Epictetus is direct. If you give up the things they took or threatened, with whom will you be angry? The anger points at your own attachment, not at their action. That is where the actual work is.
You can still groan. Epictetus says so explicitly. Just do not let it turn inward.
This exercise is one of 30 drawn from the Discourses. See the full 30 Epictetus exercises from Discourses Book 1.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Epictetus Discourses 1.18 about?
Discourses 1.18 is titled That We Should Not Be Angry at Men’s Errors and argues that anger at others is almost always misdirected. Error comes from ignorance of where the good lies, not from malice. We are angry because we overvalue externals. The chapter closes with the definition of the invincible person: one whom nothing outside the sphere of choice can disconcert.
Why does Epictetus say we should not be angry at those who err?
Because error comes from ignorance, not from malice. The thief believes the good lies in what they are taking. The adulterer believes the good lies in what they are pursuing. They are acting on a mistaken belief about where the good is. Show them their mistake and they will amend their ways. If they cannot see it, they have nothing to correct their course but their own unchecked opinion. Anger at this misunderstands both the cause of the error and the appropriate response to it.
What does Epictetus mean by the invincible person?
The invincible person is one whom nothing outside the sphere of choice can disconcert. Not someone with a strong body or powerful allies. Someone who has placed their good entirely within what is genuinely theirs: their judgments, opinions, desires, and aversions. The thief can take the lamp but not the judgment. The tyrant can chain the leg but not the choice. When nothing outside the sphere of choice can move you, there is nothing for the world to grip.
What is the Stoic view of anger?
Anger, for the Stoics, is almost always a signal that you are overvaluing something external. The robber could not make you angry if you did not first place too much value on what they took. The appropriate response to anger is not suppression but examination: what does this anger tell me I am overvaluing? What do I actually own that can be taken? Epictetus says you can groan at injury, but do not let the groan turn inward into self-pity or resentment. Assess the situation correctly and respond from the sphere of choice.
What is the Stoic exercise from Discourses 1.18?
The exercise is to use anger as a diagnostic. Name one person whose actions have made you angry. Ask whether they acted from malice or from a mistaken belief about where the good lies. Then ask what your anger tells you that you are overvaluing. Also, ask whether what was taken or threatened was actually yours or something you were lending yourself temporarily. These three questions redirect attention from the other person to your own sphere of choice, which is where the actual work is.
Want to Apply This to Your Own Life?
Reading the Discourses is the beginning, not the end. If you want to work through what Epictetus is asking of you and apply it to what you are actually dealing with right now, I offer one-on-one Stoic coaching. Start with a free consultation. Listen to The Via Stoica Podcast on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, or YouTube. Browse the Epictetus quotes collection for more passages from the Discourses.
About the Author
Benny Voncken is the founder of Via Stoica and host of The Via Stoica Podcast. He has practiced Stoicism as a way of life for over seven years and draws on almost 15 years of teaching experience to turn dense ancient ideas into daily practice. Since 2023 he has coached clients around the world through one-on-one Stoic coaching. He also leads Stoic walks across Europe, writes the monthly newsletter The Pause, and has spoken at Stoicon.
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