Epictetus Discourses 1.13: How to Treat Others Like a Stoic
How to treat others is a discourse that shows us the right way to see those around us. They're our kin and so are we of the gods.
The Discourses of Epictetus were recorded by his student Arrian during teaching sessions at Nicopolis in the early second century. Chapter 1.13 is one of the shortest in Book 1 but one of the most direct. It takes the cosmopolitan argument from chapter 1.9 and applies it to the person standing directly in front of you right now. View the full Book 1 commentary.
What Epictetus Is Arguing in Discourses 1.13
How to treat others and live in accordance with the universe is the subject of this short but direct discourse. Arrian titled it “How Can We Act In Everything In A Manner Acceptable To The Gods?” The question sounds grand, but Epictetus gets to the answer in five sections. He starts where he always does: with a practical question from the room.
"If he eats as he ought and sensibly, and, one might say, with restraint and self-control, will he not also be eating in a manner acceptable to the gods?"
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 13.1
The answer is immediate: yes. Acting sensibly and with self-control, in whatever you are doing, is already acting in a way acceptable to the rational order. The question about eating was always a question about everything. Stoicism does not divide life into sacred and mundane. Every action is an expression of your relationship to the rational order, or its opposite.
The Slave Boy and the Tempered Water
Epictetus then names a situation the visitor would have recognised immediately. You call for hot water. Your slave does not respond, or brings water that is barely warm, or cannot be found at all. How should you treat this person? The answer follows the same logic as the eating question.
"Then not to be angry, or lose your temper, is that not acceptable to the gods?"
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 13.2
Yes. Not because losing your temper is socially unacceptable. But because the person who brought you tempered water is not less than you in any way that matters. Epictetus knew this from his own life. He was a slave for most of it. He understood exactly what it felt like to be on the receiving end of contempt from someone who held legal ownership over him. When he names this example, it is not abstract philosophy. It is a lived experience.
The Kinship Argument
"Will you not bear with your own brother, who has Zeus as his forebear and is born as a son of the same seed as you, and is of the same high descent?"
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 13.3
We are all brothers and sisters in this world, coming from the same origin. Whatever story works best for you to understand this: the Stoics arrive at it through the Logos. The rational principle that constitutes all things is the same in you and in the person who brought you tempered water. They share the divine spark that you share. Oikeiōsis, the Stoic concept of natural kinship, begins with self-recognition and extends outward to all of humanity because all of humanity shares the same rational origin. This is not sentiment. It is the logical consequence of what God is.
Different roles exist. Not everyone occupies the same position in a household or an organisation. But roles are practical arrangements, not metaphysical rankings. Epictetus then turns directly to the question of what authority actually requires.
Authority Is Not Tyranny
"But if you chance to be placed in some superior station, will you at once set yourself up as a tyrant? Will you not remember what you are, and what people you are ruling over? That they are by nature your relations, your brothers; that they are the offspring of Zeus?"
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 13.3
The distinction Epictetus draws is between occupying a position of authority and becoming a tyrant. Being placed in a superior station is a practical arrangement. It tells you what your role requires of you. It does not tell you that you are superior in nature to those you are leading. The tyrant is the person who confuses the two, who mistakes the role for a metaphysical ranking and treats those beneath them in the social structure as though they are beneath them in every other sense, too.
In modern life, the superior station is not a Roman household. It is the management position, the senior role, the position of financial power over someone who needs your business, the platform with a large audience looking at someone with a smaller one. Every version of authority comes with the same question Epictetus is asking: are you going to remember what you are and what the people you are ruling over actually are, or are you going to constitute yourself a tyrant?
The Laws of the Dead and the Laws of the Gods
The visitor pushes back with the most obvious legal defence available in the Roman world.
"But I have them by right of purchase, and not they me. Do you not see where you are looking to? That it is to the earth, that it is to the pit, that it is to these wretched laws, the laws of the dead, and not to the laws of the gods that you are looking?"
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 13.5
The pit is a specific image. In ancient Athens, the barathron was the ravine into which the bodies of executed criminals were thrown. When Epictetus says you are looking to the pit, he is not speaking vaguely about worldly things. He is saying: the social hierarchy you are defending is built on the same foundation as the laws that govern where criminal corpses are dumped. These are the laws of the dead. Not divine laws. Not the laws of the rational order you share with every person you encounter.
The dismissal is complete and deliberate. Legal ownership is a law of the dead. The fact that you purchased someone tells you nothing about what they are. It only tells you what documents exist. The laws of the gods, meaning the rational order that constitutes all things equally, say something different. How can we then not treat each other as equals in the only sense that matters?
Discourses 1.13 and Status Bias
Contemporary psychology identifies the mechanism behind what the visitor is doing. When someone in a lower position makes a mistake, we tend to attribute it to their character: they are lazy, unreliable, incompetent. When a friend or equal makes the same mistake, we attribute it to circumstances: it was a difficult day, they had a lot on. This asymmetry, the fundamental attribution error, is the psychological engine behind most hierarchical contempt. We judge downward by character and upward or sideways by circumstance. Epictetus is cutting through this with the divine kinship argument. The person who brought you tempered water is your brother. You just judged him as though he were a different kind of being.
Take this with you next time you find yourself judging others. They are like you: with all their flaws, doubts, and insecurities, but also with their strengths. Treat them with respect, even when you need to correct their actions or guide them. It is part of our duty to lead those who have gone astray. But lead by example. Show the right path and make sure you are on it as well.
The Exercise: The Law of the Gods
Disciplines: Action · Assent | Timing: Before an interaction where you hold authority or social standing · 10 minutes
Before you enter an interaction where you hold some form of authority or social standing over another person, pause and ask: how are you about to use this position?
Epictetus distinguishes two sets of laws: the laws of the dead, which are social hierarchies and formal status, and the laws of the gods, which say that every person shares the same rational origin and is therefore your equal in the domain that actually matters.
Ask three questions about the interaction ahead. When they disappoint or fail you, do you attribute it to their character or to their circumstances? Are you about to engage as someone who remembers what they are and what you are, or as someone constituting themselves a tyrant? If this person had equal or higher social standing, would you approach this differently?
If the answer to the third question is yes, you are using the laws of the dead. Act from the other set instead.
This exercise is one of 30 drawn from the Discourses. See the full 30 Epictetus exercises from Discourses Book 1.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Epictetus Discourses 1.13 about?
Discourses 1.13 asks how to act in a manner acceptable to the gods and answers through a series of practical situations. Epictetus argues that treating others with restraint and without anger, regardless of their social position, is already acting in accordance with the rational order. The chapter makes its central argument through the kinship claim: everyone shares the same divine origin, which makes contempt for others a form of contempt for the rational order you share with them.
What is the Stoic argument for treating others well?
The Stoic argument is that all human beings share in the Logos, the rational principle that constitutes everything. This makes all human beings spiritual siblings regardless of their social position, nationality, or legal status. You do not treat others well because it is polite or socially required. You treat them well because they are, in the only sense that matters philosophically, your brothers and sisters. Contempt for another person is a misreading of what that person is.
What does Epictetus mean by the laws of the dead?
The laws of the dead are the social and legal conventions that create and enforce hierarchy: ownership, rank, purchase, and legal status. The pit in the same passage is a reference to the barathron, the ravine in Athens where criminal bodies were thrown. Epictetus is saying that social hierarchies are built on the same foundation as the laws governing where dead criminals are dumped. These laws tell you nothing about what a person is. The laws of the gods, meaning the rational order, say something different.
Why did Epictetus use a slave as the example in Discourses 1.13?
Epictetus was a slave for most of his life. The example of the slave who brings tempered water is not abstract philosophy. It is a lived experience: he knew from his own life exactly what it felt like to be on the receiving end of contempt from someone who held legal ownership over him. Using this example, and then arguing that the slave is your spiritual brother, is one of the most radical positions in ancient philosophy, and it comes directly from the Stoic argument about the Logos and universal kinship.
What is the Stoic exercise from Discourses 1.13?
The exercise is the authority or tyrant check. When someone in a lower position disappoints you, ask whether you are attributing it to their character or to their circumstances. Ask whether you would treat the situation differently if the person had equal or higher social standing. If the answer is yes, you are applying the laws of the dead rather than the laws of the gods. The practice is to catch that asymmetry and correct it: the person in front of you is your brother or sister in the only sense that the rational order recognises.
Want to Apply This to Your Own Life?
Reading the Discourses is the beginning, not the end. If you want to work through what Epictetus is asking of you and apply it to what you are actually dealing with right now, I offer one-on-one Stoic coaching. Start with a free consultation. Listen to The Via Stoica Podcast on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, or YouTube. Browse the Epictetus quotes collection for more passages from the Discourses.
About the Author
Benny Voncken is the founder of Via Stoica and host of The Via Stoica Podcast. He has practiced Stoicism as a way of life for over seven years and draws on almost 15 years of teaching experience to turn dense ancient ideas into daily practice. Since 2023 he has coached clients around the world through one-on-one Stoic coaching. He also leads Stoic walks across Europe, writes the monthly newsletter The Pause, and has spoken at Stoicon.
Comments 0