Epictetus Discourses 1.25: What Should We Worry About?
The Discourses of Epictetus were recorded by his student Arrian during teaching sessions at Nicopolis in the early second century. Chapter 1.25 is titled “On the Same Theme”: it continues directly from chapter 1.24 on difficulty and draws the broader conclusion. If good and evil lie entirely in the will, what is left to be troubled about? View the full Book 1 commentary.

What Epictetus Is Arguing in Discourses 1.25
Stoicism places the good entirely within the faculty of choice. Epictetus opens the chapter by following this to its logical conclusion. If that is genuinely what we believe, what remains to worry about? The chapter works through the practical answer using Zeus’s distribution, the price of external desires, Demetrius’s response to Nero, and a return to the Stoic open door.
What Is Left to Worry About?
"If these things are true, and we are not stupid or acting a part when we say that good or ill for man lies in choice, and that all else is nothing to us, why are we still troubled?"
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 25.1
"No one else has authority over the things that seriously concern us; and the things over which others have authority are of no concern to us. What is left for us to worry about?"
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 25.2
The opening is a direct challenge. Not a rhetorical device but a genuine test: do you actually believe what Stoic philosophy teaches, or are you repeating it without living it? If good and evil genuinely lie in the faculty of choice, and no one else has authority over that faculty, then the worry we experience is the proof that we have not yet fully believed what we say we believe. The gap between the doctrine and the lived reality is the subject of the entire chapter.
Zeus’s Distribution
"Has he [Zeus] not given you what is your own, free from restraint or hindrance; and what is not your own, liable to both?"
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 25.3
The Stoics believe in a deterministic universe governed by cause and effect through the Logos, the rational principle that orders everything. Into this universe we have been given something unique: a spark of reason that allows us to observe, to judge, and to assent or withhold assent. What belongs to that rational faculty is free from restraint: no force outside us can compel it without our participation. What is not in the rational faculty is liable to restraint: possessions, reputation, the body, relationships. Zeus’s distribution is not unfair. He has calibrated it perfectly. The only problem is when we decline what is ours and try to claim what belongs elsewhere.
Guard what is your own by every means: your good faith, your sense of shame, your character. These are genuinely yours and no one can take them without your permission. What belongs to others, let go of. The moment you try to hold onto what is outside the sphere of choice, you give others the means to disturb you.
What You Lose When You Reach for What Is Not Yours
"When you concern yourself with what is not your own, you lose what is your own."
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 25.4
This is perhaps the most compact statement of the Stoic practical argument in the whole of Book 1. Reaching for externals does not merely fail to give you the external: it costs you something. The attention, the anxiety, the distorted judgment that comes from placing your worth in what others control: all of this draws on what is genuinely yours. You spend your peace of mind pursuing what cannot be secured, and in doing so, you neglect the one thing that requires your full attention: the faculty of choice itself.
Judge for Yourself
"And it is for you to compare the value of these things, and judge for yourself; but do not do anything as one who is burdened and afflicted and supposes himself to be in a bad way, for no one compels you to do that."
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 25.17
"For you must always remember and hold fast to this, that the door is open."
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 25.18
No one compels you to approach any situation as a burden. The sense of burden comes from how you are reading the situation, not from the situation itself. And the Stoic open door, which appeared at the close of the previous chapter, returns here: you are always in a situation by choice, and the door remains open. A person who genuinely knows this will not let the situation burden them the way someone who believes they are trapped will. The trap is in the reading, not in the room.
Beyond the Last Tunic
"Put off my last tunic, this paltry body of mine: beyond this no one has any power over me."
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 25.21
The sequence is rational: force can strip possessions first, then clothing, then the body itself. And beyond the body? Nothing. No one has any power. The body is the last layer that external force can reach, and it reaches it through death, which nature holds over everyone, including the one threatening it. Epictetus is not describing a life of poverty or renunciation. He is describing a line beyond which power cannot go, and that line is nearer than most people think. Everything that genuinely matters is already on the other side of it.
Demetrius and Nero
"Thus Demetrius said to Nero: You threaten me with death, but nature threatens you with it!"
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 25.22
Demetrius was a Cynic philosopher who lived during Nero’s reign. Seneca admired him greatly and wrote about him in several letters to Lucilius, calling him the greatest man of the age. Nero eventually banished him. The exchange Epictetus cites is the argument from chapter 25.21 made personal and immediate: the tyrant’s threat is not unique. Nature holds the same threat over the tyrant himself. What makes Nero’s threat uniquely terrifying is only the false value we place on the body. Remove that false value and the tyrant’s weapon reveals itself as one everyone already lives under.
"If I place value on my body, I have given myself up for a slave; if on my miserable property, I am a slave likewise; for I immediately show to my own detriment how I may be taken."
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 25.23-24
This is the clearest formulation of why overvaluing externals is not just philosophically incorrect but practically dangerous. The moment you show someone what you value beyond the sphere of choice, you have shown them exactly how to control you. The person who genuinely values nothing outside the sphere of choice gives no one a grip. There is no handle for anyone to grip. This is what Demetrius demonstrated to Nero: he had not left a handle.
The Price You Pay
"But for our part had rather study and practice anything than how to become unrestrained and free."
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 25.31
The chapter closes with an observation that reads like a careful warning. Every external desire comes with a price tag. Want to be rich? You have shown others how to threaten you. Want to be admired? You have made yourself dependent on their opinions. Want to be well-connected? You have handed your behaviour to their expectations. The Stoic argument is not that you should want nothing, but that you should know what you are purchasing and with what currency. The currency is always the same: a measure of peace of mind, a measure of freedom, a handle others can use to reach you. Most people, Epictetus observes, would rather study and practice almost anything than do the one thing that would make them genuinely free.
The Exercise: The Price List
Disciplines: Desire · Action | Timing: When you notice yourself worrying about an external · 15 minutes
Name three things you are currently worried about. For each one, apply three questions.
First: is this within the sphere of choice or outside it? If it is your own judgment, opinion, or character, it is yours. If it is someone else’s opinion of you, the outcome of an event, or something that belongs to the body or to fortune, it is not.
Second: if it is outside the sphere of choice, what are you paying in peace of mind to keep worrying about it? Name the cost specifically: sleep, concentration, equanimity, the quality of your attention to what is actually yours.
Third: what handle have you left for others to grip by valuing this thing the way you do? The worry itself is almost always the proof that you are paying a price. The question is whether you have consciously decided the purchase is worth it, or whether it is simply happening to you without examination.
This exercise is one of 30 drawn from the Discourses. See the full 30 Epictetus exercises from Discourses Book 1.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Epictetus Discourses 1.25 about?
Discourses 1.25 is titled “On the Same Theme” and continues from chapter 1.24. Epictetus asks that if good and evil genuinely lie in the faculty of choice, what is left to worry about? The chapter works through Zeus’s distribution of what is ours and what is not, the price of external desires, and the Demetrius and Nero exchange, which is the practical demonstration of the chapter’s argument.
What does Epictetus say we should worry about?
Almost nothing. No one else has authority over the things that seriously concern us: the faculty of choice, our opinions, our values, our character. The things over which others have authority, such as possessions, reputation, and the body, are not our true concern. When we worry about those things, we have placed our good outside the sphere of choice, and what we worry about reveals exactly where we have placed it.
Who was Demetrius and what did he say to Nero?
Demetrius was a Cynic philosopher who lived during Nero’s reign and was greatly admired by Seneca. When Nero threatened him with death, Demetrius replied: “You threaten me with death, but nature threatens you with it.” The response removes the tyrant’s unique power by pointing out that death is not a weapon the tyrant alone holds. Nature holds it over everyone. The threat is only effective if you fear death more than you value the sphere of choice.
What does “when you concern yourself with what is not your own, you lose what is your own” mean?
Reaching for externals does not just fail to secure them: it costs you something from what is genuinely yours. The attention, anxiety, and distorted judgment that come from placing your worth in what others control all draw on your peace of mind and your faculty of choice. You spend your freedom pursuing what cannot be secured. The result is you neglect the one thing that is actually yours and that actually requires your attention.
What is the Stoic exercise from Discourses 1.25?
The Price List. Name three current worries. For each one: ask whether it is within the sphere of choice or outside it. Ask what you are paying in peace of mind to keep worrying about it. Ask what handle you have left for others to grip by valuing this thing. The worry itself is almost always proof that you are paying a price. The question is whether you have consciously decided the purchase is worth it or whether it is simply happening to you without examination.
Want to Apply This to Your Own Life?
Reading the Discourses is the beginning, not the end. If you want to work through what Epictetus is asking of you and apply it to what you are actually dealing with right now, I offer one-on-one Stoic coaching. Start with a free consultation. Listen to The Via Stoica Podcast on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, or YouTube. Browse the Epictetus quotes collection for more passages from the Discourses.
About the Author
Benny Voncken is the founder of Via Stoica, a platform dedicated to making Stoic philosophy practical for modern life. He is a writer, podcast host, and Stoic thinking partner with almost a decade of daily Stoic practice. He creates articles, workshops, and reflections that bring ancient wisdom into everyday use.
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