Epictetus Discourses 1.21: On Seeking Admiration
Delve into the discourse by Epictetus and unravel the meaning and impact of admiration. Understand the impact this praise has on our lives.
The Discourses of Epictetus were recorded by his student Arrian during teaching sessions at Nicopolis in the early second century. Chapter 1.21 is one of the shortest in Book 1 but philosophically compact. It continues the argument from chapter 1.19 on Stoic freedom by examining its most common failure mode: the desire to be admired. View the full Book 1 commentary.
What Epictetus Is Arguing in Discourses 1.21
Admiration is a feeling of respect and approval that arrives from outside. Whether it is worth having depends entirely on who is giving it and whether you need it to arrive. In this discourse, a student tells Epictetus he wants everyone he meets to admire him and acknowledge what a great philosopher he is. The chapter opens with the answer that makes all further argument unnecessary.
Your Proper Station
"When a person has his proper station in life, he does not gape after things beyond it."
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 21.1
The person who knows who they are and what their duty is does not look beyond it for something else to want. This is not complacency. It is the natural result of a well-directed faculty of choice: when your desires and aversions are aligned with nature, there is no gap in your life for admiration-seeking to fill. The need to be seen is a symptom that something internal has not been settled.
Content with Nature — But Why the Spit?
"I for my part am content if my desires and aversions are in accordance with nature, and if I exercise my impulse to act and not to act as I was born to do, and likewise my purpose, design, and assent."
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 21.2
"Why, then, do you walk around as if you had swallowed a spit?"
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 21.2
A spit is a long iron rod used for roasting meat over a fire. If you swallowed one, you would be physically incapable of bending: you would walk around unnaturally rigid, upright, stiff, looking self-important and unable to relax. The image is deliberately comic and precisely accurate. Epictetus has just said he is content if his desires and aversions are aligned with nature. Then he catches the student doing the opposite with their entire bearing: broadcasting their philosophical credentials, performing composure rather than feeling it, unable to bend because they are so conscious of being watched.
The spit line exposes a self-contradiction that the student cannot see from the inside. You say you are content with natural alignment. But your body tells a different story. Your posture is performing for an audience. The body broadcasts what the mind is trying to conceal. If the contentment were genuine, the spit would not be there.
Admired by Madmen
"Who are these people, by whom you wish to be admired? Are they not the very people whom you have been in the habit of describing as mad? What, then, do you want to be admired by madmen?"
Epictetus, Discourses, Book 1, Chapter 21.4
The second argument is even sharper. The student wants everyone to admire him. But who is everyone? These are the people whose behaviour and judgment he has already described as misguided at best, irrational at worst. He calls them fools in other conversations. Now he wants their applause. Epictetus makes the inconsistency visible with a single question. If their judgment is unreliable, why would you let it determine your sense of your own worth? The approval of those whose wisdom you do not respect is not a measure of anything except your own inconsistency.
Is All Admiration Bad?
No. Receiving the respect and approval of others is not bad in itself. There is nothing you can do about someone choosing to give it to you. When admiration comes from people whose judgment you genuinely respect, it can serve as a useful signal: you may be moving in the right direction. This is admiration received, which is neutral, and is a preferred indifferent in Stoic terms.
The problem arises when admiration becomes the motivation. When you do things in order to be seen doing them, you have handed your governing faculty to the audience. Your actions are no longer determined by what is right but by what will produce approval. This is the moment the spit appears. You become rigid, performing a version of yourself rather than being it. The better you are aligned with your own nature, the more clearly you can see admiration for what it is: a reflection in someone else’s mind, not a measure of what you actually are.
This trap is especially acute in philosophy and self-development. You can use Stoic practice itself as a status symbol. Wanting to be known as a good Stoic, as someone who has done the inner work, is its own version of the same failure. The person who needs to be seen as philosophically advanced is not practising philosophy. They are performing it, and the spit is still there.
The Exercise: The Performance Check
Disciplines: Desire · Assent | Timing: During the day, when you notice yourself performing · 5 minutes
During the day, notice once when you are presenting yourself differently from how you actually are in order to be seen in a certain way. Not the content of what you say or do, but the posture behind it. The rigidity. The spit.
Ask two questions. First: am I doing this because it is right, or because I want to be seen doing it? There is often a version of the action that would be identical in content but entirely different in motivation. Which version is this?
Second: whose admiration am I actually after here, and does their opinion of me have any real connection to where the good lies? If the answer to the second question is no, the spit is there.
You do not need to change anything immediately. The noticing is the practice. The spit loosens the moment you see it clearly.
This exercise is one of 30 drawn from the Discourses. See the full 30 Epictetus exercises from Discourses Book 1.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Epictetus Discourses 1.21 about?
Discourses 1.21 addresses those who wish to be admired. A student tells Epictetus he wants everyone he meets to acknowledge what a great philosopher he is. Epictetus exposes the self-contradiction: the student claims to be content with desires aligned with nature but walks around stiff with the need to be seen, as if he had swallowed a spit. He also asks whose admiration the student is seeking and whether those people’s opinions are worth having.
What is the Stoic view on seeking admiration?
Receiving admiration is neutral: a preferred indifferent that arrives from outside and does not determine your worth. Seeking admiration as a goal is problematic because it places your peace of mind in the hands of others. When admiration becomes the motivation for your actions, you start doing things to be seen rather than because they are right. Your governing faculty is then directed by an audience rather than by reason and nature.
What does “swallowed a spit” mean in Epictetus?
A spit is the long iron rod used for roasting meat over fire. Swallowing one would make you physically rigid: unable to bend, walking unnaturally upright and stiff. Epictetus uses this image to describe someone who claims inner contentment but whose entire bearing broadcasts the need to be noticed and admired. The body tells the truth the words don’t. The rigidity of someone who has swallowed a spit is what genuine seeking of admiration looks like from the outside.
Can a Stoic accept admiration from others?
Yes. Receiving admiration is not bad. You cannot control whether someone chooses to respect or approve of your actions. Admiration from people whose judgment you genuinely respect can also serve as a useful signal that you are moving in a good direction. The Stoic position is simply that seeking admiration as a goal corrupts your actions and places your peace of mind outside your control. The admiration that arrives without being sought is the only kind worth having.
What is the Stoic exercise from Discourses 1.21?
The exercise is the Spit Test. Notice once today when you are presenting yourself differently from how you actually are in order to be seen in a certain way. Ask whether you are doing it because it is right or because you want to be admired for it. Ask whose admiration you are after and whether their opinion has any real connection to where the good lies. The noticing is the practice. The spit loosens the moment you see it clearly.
Want to Apply This to Your Own Life?
Reading the Discourses is the beginning, not the end. If you want to work through what Epictetus is asking of you and apply it to what you are actually dealing with right now, I offer one-on-one Stoic coaching. Start with a free consultation. Listen to The Via Stoica Podcast on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, or YouTube. Browse the Epictetus quotes collection for more passages from the Discourses.
About the Author
Benny Voncken is the founder of Via Stoica, a platform dedicated to making Stoic philosophy practical for modern life. He is a writer, podcast host, and Stoic thinking partner with almost a decade of daily Stoic practice. He creates articles, workshops, and reflections that bring ancient wisdom into everyday use.
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