Epictetus Discourses 1.20: How Can Reason Contemplate Itself

The Discourses of Epictetus were recorded by his student Arrian during teaching sessions at Nicopolis in the early second century. Chapter 1.20 is the third and final chapter in the logic thread that runs through chapter 1.7 and chapter 1.17. Where chapter 1.7 showed logic is connected to conduct, chapter 1.17 argued reason must examine itself before examining anything else. Chapter 1.20 explains how that is possible and what it means in practice. View the full Book 1 commentary.

What Epictetus Is Arguing in Discourses 1.20

Since the concept of reason is fundamental to Stoic philosophy, Arrian dedicated this chapter to examining it again, this time with a specific focus: reason deals with impressions, and because it is itself constituted from impressions of a certain kind, it has the unique capacity to turn its examination on itself. The chapter also opens the door to the most succinct summary of the Stoic philosophical programme anywhere in the Discourses.

Why Reason Can Contemplate Itself

Every art and faculty has a particular kind of subject matter. The shoemaker’s art works on leather, which is entirely unlike the skill itself: leather cannot make itself into a shoe. Grammar works on written language, which is unlike the rules of grammar: the written word cannot grammatically analyse itself. Where the faculty is of a different kind from its subject matter, it cannot turn back on itself. But where it is of the same kind, it necessarily does.

Reason’s subject matter is impressions. And reason, as we will see, is itself compounded from impressions of a certain kind. This is not a coincidence. It is the structural feature that makes self-examination possible and makes it necessary.

For What Purpose?

Why are we here? Reason is what sets us apart from the other animals. They live by instinct, free in the sense that they do not know there is a choice to move with or against nature. We have something additional: the power of observation and contemplation, the capacity to approve, disapprove, or withhold judgment on every impression we receive. Nature waited for a species capable of this faculty. The answer to what it is for is brief and exact: the proper use of impressions.

This question connects to what we explored in chapter 1.14: we are the universe observing and experiencing itself. The faculty that makes that observation is part of what is being observed. Reason examining impressions is reason examining the material it is made of. We cannot step outside nature to study it. We are inside it, and the part of us that does the studying shares the same rational origin as everything it studies.

What Reason Actually Is

The circle closes here. Reason is not separate from impressions. It is built from them, formed by the accumulated process of receiving, examining, and judging impressions of a certain kind. Because it is of the same kind as what it examines, it has no choice but to examine itself when it turns its attention inward. Self-examination is not a special act. It is reason doing what it does, applied to its own operations.

Wisdom and Its Contrary

Wisdom has been given to us to contemplate things good, bad, and indifferent. Thus, wisdom is itself the good. Folly is its contrary, which means wisdom necessarily knows what folly is in order to distinguish itself from it. This is not a paradox. It is the condition that makes the examination possible. We need wisdom to understand what good is and why it is good. One can stumble on the good without knowing it. Making the right choice and knowing it is right is what makes the difference. That is the virtuous life: the conscious choice of doing what is good, informed by reason that can examine itself.

The First and Greatest Task

This is the practical payoff of the entire logic thread. The argument from chapters 1.7 and 1.17 arrives here. Socrates spent his philosophical life doing exactly this: examining impressions, never assenting to one until it had been tested, holding open the possibility of error even after a verdict had been reached. That was consistently and honestly applied. This is also what contemporary mindfulness and ACT practice ask of the practitioner: observe the automatic thought before accepting it as a report on reality. Do not fuse with the impression. Test it. The Stoic version is older, but the structure is the same.

The Greatest of Arts

The objection that philosophy requires too much effort is as old as philosophy itself. Epictetus has no patience for it. If the art of shoemaking requires years of practice, if the art of grammar requires sustained study, how could the art of living in accordance with rational nature require less? The chapter does not apologise for the difficulty. It asks what other expectation is reasonable.

The Stoic Programme in Two Clauses

This is the most succinct summary of the Stoic programme in the entire Discourses. Two clauses. The first clause connects to the theological thread running from chapter 1.3 through 1.16: following the gods means living in accordance with the Logos, the rational principle that constitutes everything. The second clause connects to the practical thread running through every chapter in Book 1: the essence of good is the proper use of impressions. What the logic thread has been building toward is this. Reason examining itself, reason testing impressions, reason understanding its own constitution, all of it arrives here. The doctrine is brief, but the way of getting there will take a lifetime if it gets there at all.

The Flesh and the Snail

Epicureanism was Stoicism’s primary rival in antiquity. Where the Stoics locate the good in virtue and the governing faculty, Epicurus located it in pleasure, and for that his school required locating it in the flesh. Epictetus engages this argument directly with one of the most pointed analogies in the chapter.

The shell houses the snail but is not what makes the snail what it is. The body houses the person but the good is not located there. Epictetus is not saying the body is worthless. He is saying that locating the good in the body is a category error: the body is the shell, not the snail. The governing faculty, the rational part, the capacity for proper use of impressions, this is the snail itself. To place the good in the flesh is to mistake the container for the content.

The Exercise: The Impression Audit

Discipline: Assent   |   Timing: After a strong emotional reaction · 15 minutes

Take one impression that arose automatically after a strong emotional reaction: a judgment you formed about a person, a situation, or yourself without pausing to examine it first. The stronger the reaction, the more useful the impression is for this exercise.

Apply three questions. First: is this an accurate report on reality, or was it shaped by desire, fear, habit, or prior association? State the impression as plainly as you can and then ask whether the plain statement and the emotionally charged version are the same thing.

Second: if you remove the emotional charge, what factual statement remains? Not what you felt about the situation. What happened, as plainly as it can be described.

Third: is this impression worth assenting to in its current form, or should you withhold judgment until you have more to work with?

You are not trying to reach a perfect verdict. You are training the faculty. The first and greatest task of the philosopher is not to get impressions right every time. It is to not admit any that has not been tested. That practice begins with one examination done once, after one strong reaction, today.

This exercise is one of 30 drawn from the Discourses. See the full 30 Epictetus exercises from Discourses Book 1.

← Discourses 1.19: How to Achieve Stoic Freedom | → Discourses 1.21: On Seeking Admiration

Frequently Asked Questions

What is Epictetus Discourses 1.20 about?

Discourses 1.20 asks how reason can contemplate itself and answers that it can because reason is itself compounded from impressions of the same kind as what it examines. The chapter closes the logic thread from chapters 1.7 and 1.17, gives the most succinct summary of the Stoic programme through a Zeno quote, names the first and greatest task of the philosopher, and engages the Epicurean argument about the good residing in the flesh with the snail and shell analogy.

How can reason contemplate itself according to Epictetus?

Reason can contemplate itself because it is of the same kind as its subject matter. Every faculty can only contemplate what is like itself. The shoemaker’s art works on leather, which is unlike it, so the art cannot contemplate itself. Reason works on impressions, and reason is itself compounded from impressions of a certain kind. Therefore, reason can and must turn its examination on itself. Self-examination is not a special act for reason: it is reason doing what it naturally does.

What is the proper use of impressions in Stoic philosophy?

The proper use of impressions is the Stoic name for the correct application of reason to the data we receive from the world. An impression is the raw data of consciousness: a perception, an automatic thought, a feeling about a situation. The proper use of it means examining it before assenting to it, distinguishing between an accurate report on reality and one shaped by desire, fear, or habit, and responding from reason rather than from unexamined reaction. According to Zeno, as quoted by Epictetus, the essence of good consists in this practice.

What does Epictetus say is the first and greatest task of the philosopher?

The first and greatest task of the philosopher is to put impressions to the test and distinguish between them, and not admit any that has not been tested. This follows from the argument that reason is constituted from impressions: if reason is to operate correctly, it must examine the impressions it is built from and continues to receive. Not testing impressions is reason failing to be reason.

What is the Stoic exercise from Discourses 1.20?

The exercise is the Impression Test. Take one automatic judgment that arose today without examination. Ask whether it is an accurate report on reality or shaped by desire, fear, or habit. Remove the emotional charge and ask what factual statement remains. Then decide whether it is worth assenting to or whether you should withhold judgment. This is the practice in its most basic form. Not admitting any impression that has not been tested is a lifelong discipline that begins with one examination done once today.

Want to Apply This to Your Own Life?

Reading the Discourses is the beginning, not the end. If you want to work through what Epictetus is asking of you and apply it to what you are actually dealing with right now, I offer one-on-one Stoic coaching. Start with a free consultation. Listen to The Via Stoica Podcast on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, or YouTube. Browse the Epictetus quotes collection for more passages from the Discourses.

About the Author

Benny Voncken is the founder of Via Stoica, a platform dedicated to making Stoic philosophy practical for modern life. He is a writer, podcast host, and Stoic thinking partner with almost a decade of daily Stoic practice. He creates articles, workshops, and reflections that bring ancient wisdom into everyday use.